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ABSTRACT
Motivated by public policy debates about bank consolidation and conflicting theoretical predictions
about the relationship between the market structure of the banking industry and bank fragility, this
paper studies the impact of bank concentration, bank regulations, and national institutions on the
likelihood of suffering a systemic banking crisis. Using data on 70 countries from 1980 to 1997, we
find that crises are less likely in economies with (i) more concentrated banking systems, (ii) fewer



















The consolidation of banks around the globe is fueling an active public policy debate on the 
impact of consolidation on financial stability.
1  Indeed, economic theory provides conflicting 
predictions about the relationship between the market structure of the banking industry and banking 
system fragility.  Motivated by public policy debates and ambiguous theoretical predictions, this 
paper investigates empirically the impact of bank concentration on banking system stability.   
Some theoretical arguments and country comparisons suggest that a less concentrated banking 
sector with many small banks is more prone to financial crises than a concentrated banking sector 
with a few large banks (Allen and Gale, 2000, 2003).  First, proponents of the “concentration-
stability” view hold that large banks can diversify better so that banking systems characterized by a 
few large banks will be less fragile than banking systems with many small banks.
2  Second, 
concentrated banking systems may enhance profits and therefore lower bank fragility.  High profits 
provide a “buffer” against adverse shocks and increase the franchise value of the bank, reducing 
incentives for bank owners to take excessive risk (Hellmann, Murdoch, and Stiglitz, 2000).  Third, 
some hold that a few large banks are easier to monitor than many small banks, so that corporate 
control of banks will be more effective and the risks of contagion less pronounced in a concentrated 
banking system.  According to Allen and Gale (2000), the U.S., with its large number of small banks, 
supports this “concentration-stability” view since it has had a history of much greater financial 
instability than the U.K or Canada, where the banking sector is dominated by fewer larger banks.   
                                                 
1 See Group of Ten (2001), Bank for International Settlements (2001), International Monetary Fund (2001), and Boyd and 
Graham (1998, 1991). 
2 Models by Diamond (1984), Ramakrishnan and Thakor (1984), Boyd and Prescott (1986), Williamson (1986), Allen 
(1990), and others predict economies of scale in intermediation.   2   
An opposing view is that a more concentrated banking structure enhances bank fragility.  
First, advocates of the “concentration-fragility” view note that large banks frequently receive 
subsidies through implicit “too big to fail” policies.
3  This greater subsidy for large banks may in turn 
intensify risk-taking incentives, increasing the fragility of concentrated banking systems (Boyd and 
Runkle, 1992 and Mishkin, 1999).
4  Second, proponents of the concentration-fragility view would 
disagree with the proposition that a few large banks are easier to monitor than many small banks.  If 
size is positively correlated with complexity, then large banks may be more opaque than small banks, 
which would tend to produce a positive relationship between concentration and fragility.  Finally, 
Boyd, and De Nicolo  (2003) stress that banks with greater market power tend to charge higher 
interest rates to firms, which induces firms to assume greater risk.  If concentration is positively 
associated with banks having market power, this model predicts a positive relationship between 
concentration and bank fragility. 
Despite conflicting theoretical predictions and policy debates, there is surprisingly little cross-
country empirical evidence on bank structure and fragility.  For the United States, Boyd and Runkle 
(1993) examine 122 bank holding companies.  They find that there is an inverse relationship between 
size and the volatility of asset returns, but no evidence that large banks are less likely to fail.  In fact 
they observe that large banks failed somewhat more often in the 1971-90 period.  They explain this 
result by showing that larger banks are more highly leveraged and less profitable in terms of asset 
returns.   
                                                 
3 Even in the absence of deposit insurance, banks are prone to excessive risk-taking due to limited liability for their equity 
holders and to their high leverage (Stiglitz, 1972). 
4 There is a literature that examines deposit insurance and its effect on bank decisions.  According to this literature (e.g. 
Merton (1977), Sharpe (1978), Flannery (1989), Kane (1989), and Chan, Greenbaum and Thakor (1992)) – mis-priced 
deposit insurance produces an incentive for banks to take risk.  If the regulatory treatment were the same for insured 
banks of all sizes, these models would predict no relationship between bank size and riskiness.  Since regulators fear 
potential macroeconomic consequences of large bank failures, most countries have implicit “too large to fail” policies 
which protect all liabilities of very large banks whether they are insured or not.  Thus, largest banks frequently receive a   3   
Although there is a growing cross-country empirical literature on banking crises, this 
literature does not address the issue of banking structure.  Earlier work has mostly focused on 
identifying (i) the macroeconomic determinants of banking crises (Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, 
1998, henceforth DD), (ii) the relationship between banking and currency crises (Kaminsky and 
Reinhart, 1999), (iii) the impact of financial liberalization on bank stability (DD, 1999), and (iv) the 
impact of deposit insurance design on bank fragility (DD, 2003).  Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2004) 
examine the relationship between bank regulations and crises, but they do not examine bank 
concentration and they use pure cross-country comparisons rather than panel analyses. 
This paper studies the impact of bank concentration, bank regulations, and national 
institutions on the likelihood of suffering a systemic banking crisis using data on 70 countries over 
the period 1980-1997.  This is the first paper to examine the impact of concentration on crises across 
a broad cross-section of countries while controlling for differences in regulatory policies, national 
institutions governing property rights and economic freedom, the ownership structure of banks, and 
macroeconomic and financial conditions.
5  To draw accurate inferences about the impact of banking 
structure on crises, we control for an array of factors that may influence both bank concentration and 
fragility.  We control for international differences in the generosity of deposit insurance regimes, 
capital regulations, restrictions on bank entry, and regulatory restrictions on bank activities.  
Furthermore, to assess the impact of concentration on crises, we need to control for cross-country 
differences in bank ownership, i.e., the degree to which the state and foreigners own the country’s 
banks.  Finally, we control for the overall institutional environment governing economic activity as 
                                                                                                                                                                      
greater net subsidy from the government (O’Hara and Shaw, 1990).  This subsidy may in turn increase the risk-taking 
incentives of the larger banks. For an analysis of the corporate governance of banks, see Macey and O’Hara (2003). 
5 Demirgüç-Kunt, Laeven and Levine (2004) investigate the impact of bank concentration and regulations on bank net 
interest margins, but they do not examine bank fragility.   4   
well as the level of economic development, economic growth, inflation, terms of trade changes, credit 
growth, etc.  
The paper has three major findings.  First, we find that crises are less likely in more 
concentrated banking systems.  This is consistent with the concentration-stability view’s argument 
that banking systems characterized by a few, large banks are more stable than less concentrated 
banking markets.  Second, the paper shows that more competition lowers the probability that a 
country will suffer a systemic banking crisis.  The data indicate that fewer regulatory restrictions on 
banks – lower barriers to bank entry and fewer restrictions on bank activities – reduce bank fragility.  
Third, countries with national institutions that promote competition in general have a lower 
likelihood of suffering a systemic banking crisis.  These results are not driven by reverse causality 
and are robust to an array of sensitivity checks.  In terms of linking the results back to specific parts 
of the concentration-stability view, the finding that competition reduces fragility is inconsistent with 
the argument that concentrated banking systems boost profits and therefore reduce fragility.  Rather, 
the evidence is more consistent with the views that concentrated banking systems tend to have banks 
that are better diversified or easier to monitor than banks in less concentrated banking systems. 
The results must be qualified.  We investigate systemic banking crises, which are very 
difficult to define and date.  Consequently, we use different definitions of and dates for crises and 
obtain robust results.  Nevertheless, future work that assesses the impact of the market structure of 
the banking industry and bank regulations on individual bank fragility will provide a valuable 
complement to our research. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section II describes the data set and presents 
summary statistics. Section III explains the methodology used in empirical tests.  Section IV contains 
the main results and Section V concludes.   5   
 
II.  Data and Summary Statistics 
          
This section describes the data.  The Appendix provides more detailed variable definitions 
and data sources.   
Crisis is a dummy variable that equals one if the country is going through a systemic crisis, 
and zero if it is not.  Following DD (2003), we identify and date episodes of banking sector distress 
using primarily information from Lindgren, Garcia and Saal (1996) and Caprio and Klingebiel 
(1999).  Then, these episodes of distress are classified as systemic if emergency measures were taken 
to assist the banking system (such as bank holidays, deposit freezes, blanket guarantees to depositors 
or other bank creditors), or if large-scale nationalizations took place.  Episodes were also classified as 
systemic if non-performing assets reached at least 10 percent of total assets at the peak of the crisis, 
or if the cost of the rescue operations was at least 2 percent of GDP.  Many crises run for multiple 
years.  We exclude the years after the initial year of the crisis because during a crisis, the behavior of 
some of the explanatory variables is likely to be affected by the crisis itself, leading to reverse 
causality.  Note, however, that including the crisis years does not change the conclusions. Also, some 
countries experience more than one crisis.  For instance, Turkey suffered systemic banking crises in 
1982, 1991, and 1994.  For the period 1980-1997, the sample includes all countries covered in the 
International Financial Statistics, excluding countries in transition, those without data, etc., as 
discussed in DD (2003).  This results in 79 countries and 51 crisis episodes.  Table 1 lists this 
information. Later in the paper we also investigate robustness of our results to differences in the crisis 
definition. 
Concentration equals the share of assets of the three largest banks.  We compute a measure of 
bank concentration using the Bankscope database compiled by Fitch-IBCA, which reports bank 
balance sheet data in a large cross-section of countries beginning in 1988.  However, because the   6   
sample of banks covered increased significantly over the sample period, changes in the measure of 
concentration may just reflect changes in coverage.  To reduce this potential problem, we average the 
measure over the period 1988-1997.  We have data on concentration for 70 countries including 47 
crisis episodes. As reported in Tables 1 and 2, most countries have concentrated banking systems 
with a sample mean of 72 percent.  Still, there is wide variation in the sample, with concentration 
levels ranging from less than 20 percent for the U.S. to 100 percent for many African countries.  
Simple correlations do not show a significant relationship between the crisis dummy and bank 
concentration, although the sign is negative. 
Using this measure of concentration may blur the interpretation of estimation results since for 
many observations the crisis date would precede the time period for which we have the concentration 
values.   However, we also use the initial level of concentration at the start of the sample period and 
focus on crises that occurred after this date.  Although this cuts the number of observations in half 
and reduces crisis episodes to 20, we confirm our results. 
To investigate the relationship between banking crises and bank concentration, we control for 
many factors.  Specifically, we begin with the econometric specification in DD (2003) and include 
the same regressors.  Thus, we include the rate of growth of real GDP, the change in the external 
terms of trade, and the rate of inflation, to capture macroeconomic developments that are likely to 
affect the quality of bank assets.  The short-term real interest rate is included to capture the banks’ 
cost of funds.  Also, higher real interest rate may affect bank profitability increasing default rates.  
Bank vulnerability to sudden capital outflows triggered by a run on the currency and bank exposure 
to foreign exchange risk are measured by the rate of exchange rate depreciation and by the ratio of 
M2 to foreign exchange reserves.  Lagged credit growth is also a control since high rates of credit 
expansion may finance an asset price bubble that may cause a crisis when it bursts.  We also include   7   
DD’s (2003) index of moral hazard caused by deposit insurance generosity since they find that it 
contributes significantly to financial fragility.
6  Finally, GDP per capita is used to control for the level 
of development of the country, which DD (2003) included it to proxy for the quality of regulations 
and the general institutional environment. Thus, we leave GDP per capita out of the benchmark when 
we explore the impact of specific banking regulations and institutional indicators. 
Simple correlations in Table 2 suggest that banking crises are more likely in countries with 
higher levels of inflation and exchange rate depreciation, and less likely in growing countries with 
higher GDP per capita. 
In addition to bank concentration, we augment the benchmark specification in DD by using 
measures of bank regulation and supervision, bank ownership, the competitiveness of the banking 
system and the economy in general, and a summary institutional index.  Measures of bank regulation 
and supervision come from Barth, et al., (2001, 2004).  The data set is collected through surveys of 
government officials in the late 1990s, but according to additional analyses by Barth, et al., (2001) 
and Carkovic and Levine (2002), these aspects of bank regulation do not change much. 
We use four measures of bank regulation and supervision.   
Fraction of Entry Denied is the number of entry applications denied as a fraction of the 
number of applications received from domestic and foreign entities. This is a measure of entry 
restrictions in banking and thus the contestability of the market.  To the extent restricted entry 
increases bank profits, this variable would be associated with a lower rate of fragility.  If however, 
restricted entry induces inefficiencies in the banking market, it could also lead to greater fragility.   
                                                 
6 To build an aggregate index of moral hazard, DD (2003) estimate the first principal component of various deposit 
insurance design features.  Specifically, they use coinsurance, coverage of foreign currency and interbank deposits, type 
of funding, source of funding, management, membership, and the level of explicit coverage to create this aggregate index 
that increases with the generosity of the deposit insurance regime. The index varies over time since different countries 
adopted deposit insurance or revised its design features at different points in time.   8   
Activity Restrictions aggregates measures that indicate whether bank activities in the 
securities, insurance, and real estate markets and ownership and control of nonfinancial firms are (1) 
unrestricted, (2) permitted, (3) restricted, or (4) prohibited.  The aggregate indicator has therefore a 
possible maximum variation between four and 16, with higher numbers indicating more restrictions 
on bank activities and nonfinancial ownership and control. If these restrictions manage to keep banks 
from entering lines of business that are too risky for them to adequately evaluate or manage, banking 
systems with greater restrictions may be more stable.  If however, restrictions prevent firms from 
diversifying outside their traditional lines of business, they may increase the fragility of the system.   
Required Reserves is the ratio of bank assets that regulators require banks to hold as reserves.  
Banking systems with higher ratios of required reserves may be more stable since they would have a 
greater buffer to absorb liquidity shocks.  However, greater required reserves are also a tax on the 
banking system, which may lower profits and raise fragility. 
Capital Regulatory Index is a summary measure of capital stringency, and it is given by the 
sum of initial capital stringency and overall capital requirements.  To the extent that book capital is 
an accurate measure of bank solvency we expect better capitalized banks to be less fragile.    
Table 2 indicates that fraction denied, activity restrictions, and required reserves are positively 
and significantly correlated with each other.  Capital regulatory index is also positively correlated 
with required reserves but negatively correlated with activity restrictions.  The moral hazard index is 
negatively and significantly correlated with all regulatory variables except capital regulatory index 
where the correlation is positive.   It is also interesting that deposit insurance schemes in concentrated 
banking systems tend to be designed such that moral hazard is significantly lower. Among the 
regulatory variables only activity restrictions is significantly correlated –albeit at ten percent - with 
the crisis dummy, and the sign is positive.     9   
We also control for ownership.  If public banks are considered to have government 
guarantees, banking systems with a larger share of public banks may be less prone to banking runs.  
However, inefficiencies in public banks may also make them more fragile, destabilizing the system.  
Indeed, Caprio and Martinez-Peria (2000) and Barth, et al., (2001) find evidence supporting the 
former argument.   
The extent of foreign bank ownership is another important control.  To the extent foreign 
banks improve domestic banks’ efficiency (as found in Claessens, Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 
2001), they may also make the system more stable.  However, reduction in profits due to higher 
competition from foreign banks may also hurt the domestic banks making the system more fragile.    
State Ownership and Foreign Ownership are from Barth, et al., (2001), defined as the 
percentage of banking system’s assets in banks that are 50 percent or more government or foreign 
owned.  As in the case of regulatory variables, the assumption is that ownership of banks does not 
vary significantly over the years.
7  Simple correlations in Table 2 do not reveal significant 
relationships between bank ownership variables and crisis occurrence. 
We also use three additional variables to capture the extent of banking freedoms and general 
economic freedoms and institutional environment.   
Banking Freedom is an indicator of relative openness of the banking system.  Specifically, it 
is a composite index of whether foreign banks and financial services firms are able to operate freely, 
how difficult it is to open domestic banks and other financial services firms, how heavily regulated 
the financial system is, the presence of state-owned banks, whether the government influences 
                                                 
7 We also use state bank data from La Porta, Lopez de Silanes, and Shleifer (2002) who report figures on the percentage 
of assets of the largest 10 banks owned by the government.  For each country there are two data points, one for 1995, and 
one referring to public ownership “before the privatizations of the 1990s.”  In the regression, we use the latter figures for 
the 1980s and the former for the 1990s.     10    
allocation of credit, and whether banks are free to provide customers with insurance products and 
invest in securities.  Higher values indicate fewer restrictions on banking freedoms.   
Economic Freedom is an indicator of how a country’s policies rank in terms of providing 
economic freedoms.  It is a composite of ten indicators ranking policies in the areas of trade, 
government finances, government interventions, monetary policy, capital flows and foreign 
investment, banking and finance, wages and prices, property rights, regulation, and black market 
activity. Higher scores indicate polices more conducive to competition and economic freedom. Both 
variables are available from the Heritage Foundation and are average values for the 1995-97 period.  
To the extent freedoms allow banks to improve efficiency and to engage in different activities and 
diversify their risks, we expect increased level of freedoms to reduce fragility.  However, it is also 
true that greater freedoms allow banks to undertake greater risks, particularly if the underlying 
institutional environment and existing regulations and supervision distort risk-taking incentives.  
Thus, overall greater freedoms may also lead to greater bank fragility.   
KKZ_Composite is an index of the overall level of institutional development constructed by 
Kaufman, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton (1999).  The underlying indicators are voice and accountability, 
government effectiveness, political stability, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption.  
This index is available for 1998.  We expect better institutions to lead to reduced bank fragility, 
controlling for all other factors.   Simple correlations indicate that the crisis dummy is negatively and 
significantly correlated with the two freedom indicators and the institutions variable.  Countries with 
better institutions also tend to have more competitive banking systems with fewer regulatory 
restrictions.   11    
III. Methodology 
In estimating the crisis model, we follow DD (1998, 2003) and use a logit probability model.  
Using this model of banking crisis, we can test the hypothesis that bank concentration and 
competition have an impact on fragility when controlling for other factors.    Thus, we estimate the 
probability that a systemic crisis will occur at a particular time in a particular country, assuming that 
this probability is a function of the explanatory variables (X(i,t)) discussed above. Let P(i, t) denote a 
dummy variable that takes the value of one when a banking crisis occurs in country i and time t and a 
value of zero otherwise. β is a vector of n unknown coefficients and F(βΝX(i, t)) is the cumulative 
probability distribution function evaluated at βΝX(i, t). Then, the log-likelihood function of the 
model is: 
Ln L =  3t=1..T 3i=1..n{P(i,t)ln[F(βΝX(i,t))] + (1-P(i,t)) ln[1- F(βΝX(i,t))]}. 
In modeling the probability distribution we use the logistic functional form, which is 
commonly used in studying banking difficulties.
8  We estimate the model with robust standard errors 
since there may be heteroskedasticity across different observations.  Observations within each 
country group may also be correlated.  We also deal with this problem below, by relaxing the 
assumption that errors are independent within country observations. 
  When interpreting the regression results, it is important to remember that the estimated 
coefficients do not indicate an increase in the probability of a crisis given a one-unit increase in the 
corresponding explanatory variables.  Instead, the coefficients reflect the effect of a change in an 
explanatory variable on ln(P(i,t)/(1-P(i,t))).  Therefore, the increase in probability depends on the 
original probability and thus upon the initial values of all the independent variables and their 
coefficients.  While the sign of the coefficient does indicate the direction of the change, the   12    
magnitude depends on the slope of the cumulative distribution function at β’X(i,t). In other words, a 
change in the explanatory variable will have different effects on the probability of a crisis depending 
on the country’s initial crisis probability.  Under the logistic specification, if a country has an 
extremely high (or low) initial probability of crisis, a marginal change in the independent variables 
has little effect on its prospects, while the same marginal change has a greater effect if the country’s 
probability of crisis in an intermediate range. 
In the analysis presented below, we investigate the impact of bank concentration variable and 
different regulatory, competition, ownership and institutional variables on bank fragility one at a 
time. We also analyze if the impact of concentration is robust to controlling for regulatory variables 
and indicators of competition and institutional development and whether there are significant 
interactions with concentration and these variables.   Finally, we explore the potential non-linearity of 
the crisis-concentration relationship, and discuss the robustness of our results to different definitions 
of concentration and reverse causality. 
                                                                                                                                                                     
8 In addition to DD (1998,1999, 2003) also see Cole and Gunther (1993), Gonzalez-Hermosillo et al. (1997), and 
Demirguc-Kunt (1989).   13    
IV. Results 
 
A. Main  findings 
1. Concentration and crises 
The concentration variable enters the regressions negatively, significantly, and with an 
economically large coefficient.  This result suggests that concentrated banking systems are less 
vulnerable to banking crises (Table 3).  Evaluating the marginal impact of concentration on the 
probability of crisis at the mean values for all variables, we see that a one standard deviation increase 
in concentration leads to a decrease in crisis probability of one percent.  Since crisis probabilities at 
any point in time are quite low, with a mean value of four percent, this is a substantial reduction.  
This result is supportive of the concentration-stability view that concentration fosters a more stable 
banking system.  
Among the control variables, GDP growth and per capita GDP enter negatively, while the real 
interest rates enter positively, as suggested by economic theory and earlier empirical studies.  Credit 
growth is positive, but significant only at the ten percent level, which lends weak support to the 
argument that credit booms signal future fragility.  Confirming the results of DD (2003), moral 
hazard enters positive and significantly, indicating that deposit insurance design can have an 
important impact on fragility, and the result is weaker controlling for bank concentration.  The model 
also fits the data well, classifying 65 percent of all observations and over 70 percent of crisis 
observations accurately.
9 
In column (3) we also add a squared concentration variable to the specification to check for 
potential nonlinearities in the relationship between concentration and banking crises.  When including 
the squared term, the concentration variable retains a negative and significant coefficient at the ten   14    
percent level, while the squared concentration term is positive and insignificant.  Testing for the joint 
significance of the two variables, we see that together the coefficients are significantly different from 
zero at the five percent level.  This indicates that, although weak, at very high levels of concentration, 
there is an offsetting effect at work where concentrated banking systems are no longer as stable.  
Below, we try to understand the nature of this nonlinearity better.   Finally, the table shows that the 
concentration result is not sensitive to excluding GDP per capita from the regression. 
2. Concentration, regulations, and crises 
In Table 4, we include indicators of bank regulation to the specification. These specifications 
exclude GDP per capita since it is also a proxy for the institutional environment.  We have also 
estimated specifications where we have left out the concentration variable and included only the 
regulation supervision variables one at a time.  The results on these variables are virtually unchanged, 
thus we do not report them for brevity.   
The results indicate that tighter entry restrictions and more severe regulatory restrictions on 
bank activities boost bank fragility (Table 4). These are consistent with the results obtained by Barth 
et al. (2004), who examine the impact of entry restrictions on crises in a purely cross-country 
investigation that does not control for bank concentration.  A higher fraction of entry applications 
denied- a proxy for tighter entry regulations – leads to higher levels of fragility in the banking 
system.  This is consistent with the argument that restricted entry reduces the efficiency of the 
banking system, also making it more vulnerable to external shocks.  Similarly, we find that 
restrictions on bank activities increase crisis probabilities.  This result indicates that overall these 
restrictions prevent banks from diversifying outside their traditional business, reducing their ability to 
                                                                                                                                                                      
9 In classifying observations, predicted probabilities significantly higher than 4 percent (no of crisis observations divided 
by total number of observations which equals the sample mean of the crisis dummy) are classified as crisis observations 
and those below 4 percent are classified as no crisis.   15    
reduce the riskiness of their portfolios.  The required reserves and capital regulatory index do not 
enter with significant coefficients.   
The results also indicate that the concentration result is robust to inclusion of regulatory 
variables.  The overall effect of bank concentration on crisis likelihood is still negative and 
significant.  In unreported regressions we have also explored specifications where we have interacted 
the concentration variable with these regulatory variables, but the interaction terms did not enter 
significantly. 
3. Concentration, ownership, institutions, and crises 
In Table 5, we explore the impact of concentration, bank ownership, and the overall 
institutional environment variables on bank fragility.  We examined each of the ownership and 
institutional indicators both with and without concentration included in the regression.  Since the 
coefficients on the ownership and institutional variables are not significantly different in either 
specification, we only report the results of the regressions that include concentration.   The first two 
columns explore the impact of bank ownership on fragility.   
The data do not indicate a strong link between bank fragility and either state or foreign 
ownership. While some regressions indicate a positive impact of state ownership on bank fragility, 
this result is not very robust.
10  The impact of foreign ownership on fragility is negative, but 
insignificant. 
In contrast, the variables that capture the general openness and competitiveness of the banking 
system and the economy enter with negative and very significant coefficients.  Thus countries with 
greater freedoms in banking and generally more competitive economic policies are less likely to 
experience banking crises.  This is the case despite the fact these policies also tend to reduce entry 
                                                 
10 In the specification that excludes bank concentration, state ownership is not significant. Replicating these regressions 
using LLS (1999) measure of state bank ownership confirm these findings.     16    
barriers and are correlated with reduced levels of bank concentration.   Better institutional 
environment is also associated with a lower probability of systemic crisis, as expected.  The evidence 
is consistent with theories that emphasize the stabilizing effects of competition (Boyd and De Nicolo, 
2003), but inconsistent with the many models that stress the destabilizing effects from competition.
11 
The results on bank concentration are robust to including bank ownership and general 
competition and institutional variables.  In unreported regressions we also explored whether the 
impact of concentration on fragility differs in countries with different levels of freedoms and 
institutional development, by including interaction terms in the regressions.  None of these interaction 
terms were significant, suggesting that bank concentration reduces fragility regardless of the 
competition environment or the institutional development of the country. 
4. Concentration, regulations, ownership, institutions, and crises 
In Table 6, we simultaneously include bank concentration, regulations, ownership, and 
institutions.  In each specification we enter bank concentration, the index of overall institutional 
development, and a measure of regulation.   
Bank concentration remains significantly, negatively associated with bank fragility even when 
controlling for the regulatory variables and overall institutional development.  Indeed, the size of the 
coefficient on concentration is not substantially affected by expanding the conditioning information 
set.   
In contrast, the regulatory restriction variables and the overall institutional development 
indicators exhibit substantial multicollinearity.  Their independent significance is materially 
weakened in Table 6 when they are included jointly.  These results suggest that regulatory 
                                                 
11 Boyd and De Nicolo  (2003) stress that competition exerts a stabilizing impact on banks because more competitive 
banks charge lower interest rates to firms and these lower rates reduce the likelihood of default.  This prediction is 
consistent with our results.  However, Boyd and De Nicolo  (2003) use bank concentration as an indicator of bank   17    
approaches to banking are part of the overall national approach to openness, competition, and private 
property in the economy.   
The evidence in Table 6 suggests that bank concentration is not a simple proxy for regulatory 
restrictions or national institutions.  Bank concentration enters negatively in the crisis regression 
when controlling for regulations and institutions. These findings support the view that concentrated 
banking systems are more stable than less concentrated systems.  The data are inconsistent with 
theories that predict more fragility in more concentrated banking systems. 
The findings that (i) concentration lowers fragility and (ii) low competition raises fragility 
imply that future research needs to move beyond a simple “concentration-stability” versus 
“concentration-fragility” debate where concentration is viewed as a simple proxy for market power.  
There are at least three possible explanations for our finding that concentration is negatively 
associated with bank fragility.  First, concentrated banking system may have bigger banks that are 
better diversified than less concentrated banking systems.  Second, concentrated banking systems 
may reduce fragility by boosting bank profits.  Third, concentrated banking systems with a few large 
banks may be easier to monitor than a banking system with many small banks.  Recall, however, that 
this paper finds that greater competition in banking promotes bank stability, which is inconsistent 
with the argument that concentration enhances stability by boosting bank profits.  If our measures of 
regulatory restrictions and market openness do a reasonably good job of measuring the 
competitiveness of the banking industry, then the finding that concentration remains negatively 
associated with the probability of suffering a systemic banking crises while controlling for the 
competitiveness of the market implies that concentration is measuring “something else” besides 
market power.  Thus, within the concentration-stability view, at least two remaining explanations 
                                                                                                                                                                      
competition.  Thus, they stress that concentration will exert a destabilizing impact on banks, which is inconsistent with 
our results.     18    
may account for the positive link between concentration and stability: more diversification and easier 
monitoring. We hope that future studies at the individual bank-level can identify why bank 
concentration is negatively correlated with bank fragility even after controlling for the degree of 
competition in the banking industry.
12  
B. Sensitivity  analyses 
In Table 7, we try to better understand how the relationship between concentration and 
fragility changes at high levels of bank concentration.  In columns (1) to (6) we define a high 
concentration dummy for different cut-off levels of concentration using 45
th to 70
th percentiles, where 
the dummy takes the value one at this cut-off value of concentration or higher. Results indicate that 
the high concentration dummy is significant between the 45
th and 65
th percentiles, for concentration 
levels between 74 and 84 percent.  However, once we hit the 70
th percentile, at concentrations levels 
of 87 percent or higher, the effect is no longer significant.  The loss of significance may be due to the 
fact that we only have 11 countries with concentration levels of over 87 percent that experienced a 
crisis, and when the sample becomes very imbalanced with respect to crisis/non-crisis observations 
estimation becomes imprecise.  In the last column, we estimate a polynomial, including squared and 
cubed concentration terms.  The squared term is positive and the cubed term is negative in this 
specification, both significant at ten percent, suggesting that there are indeed nonlinear effects at high 
levels of concentration.  To see if in addition to the intercept change there is also a slope change at 
high concentration levels, we also explored specifications where we included an interaction term of 
                                                 
12 We tried to assess directly the views that (1) concentration is negatively related to bank fragility because a few large 
banks tend to be better diversified and (2) concentration is negatively related to bank fragility because a few large banks 
are easier to monitor than many small banks.  However, the available measures of these two views at the country level are 
very crude.  To proxy for the diversification channel, we used measures of bank size, economy size, an indicator of the 
ability of banks to diversify abroad, and an indicator of whether regulatory authorities enforce diversification guidelines.  
When controlling for these variables, concentration remained significant and these proxies for diversification did not enter 
significantly.  To measure monitoring complexity, we used the number of banks in the economy and the indicator of 
regulatory restrictions on bank activities (since more complex financial institutions – that is, banks that are able to engage   19    
the concentration variable and high concentration dummy.  The coefficient estimate was not 
significant.  
We conclude that while there is some evidence that the impact of concentration on stability is 
less strong at high levels of concentration, this result is somewhat sensitive to how we define high 
concentration.  In sum, our results indicate that the overall effect of concentration on fragility is 
negative at all levels of bank concentration, even after we control for bank regulation and 
supervision, differences in bank ownership, the level of competitiveness in banking and the economy 
and general institutional development. 
In Table 8, we investigate the sensitivity of our results to the way we define the crisis dummy 
and the concentration variable.  As discussed above, when a crisis lasts for more than one year, we 
only include the first year of the crisis and omit the other years.  In column 2, we include these crisis 
period observations that occur after the first year of the crisis and treat them as crisis observations.  In 
column 3, we include these crisis period observations that occur after the first year of the crisis and 
treat them as non-crisis observations.  As shown, the results are not sensitive to the treatment of the 
crisis period observations that occur after the first year of the crisis.  In the next two columns we 
redefine the crisis dummy using the definitions provided in Caprio and Klingebiel (1999).  Column 4 
still focuses on systemic bank crises
13 and column 5 also includes borderline crises.
14  Since the focus 
of our study is on systemic crises, we think it is more accurate to only examine system-wide failures.  
Nonetheless, concentration is still negative and significant at the ten percent level.   
                                                                                                                                                                      
in underwriting, brokerage activities, insurance activities, etc. – maybe more difficult to monitor).  Again, these proxies 
did not change our findings on concentration.   
13 Portugal and Guyana are re-defined as noncrisis countries and India, Italy, Jordan, Papua New Guinea, and US are 
excluded from the sample since they are classified as borderline as opposed to systemic banking crises.   
14 Portugal and Guyana are re-defined as noncrisis countries and the following crises are added to the sample Burundi 
(1994-97), Canada (1983-85), Congo (1992-97), Denmark (1987-92), and France (1994-95).   20    
Next we turn to the definition of the concentration variable. In column 6 we first replicate the 
baseline regression replacing the concentration variable by the one obtained from Barth, et al., 
(2001).  This measure of concentration, obtained through surveys of bank regulators, is calculated as 
the fraction of deposits held by the five largest commercial banks in each country as of end-1999.  
We expect this measure not to suffer from problems of differential coverage in each country since the 
source is the bank regulators themselves.  Using this different measure of bank concentration, we get 
very similar results.  
There may exist concerns regarding reverse causality.  This would be the case if systemic 
crises led to lower levels of concentration in the banking system through greater entry or changes in 
general competition policies.  When we inspect individual crisis cases in our sample, however, we do 
not see a significant pattern of reduced concentration after the crisis episodes and the concentration 
levels do not vary significantly from year to year.
15  Nevertheless, we estimate a specification where 
we define concentration as the initial level of concentration (1988 or the first available year) instead 
of the 1988-97 average.   As can be seen in column 7 of Table 8, this does not change our results 
significantly, which is consistent with the observation that concentration does not vary much over 
time.  This estimation is still subject to problems though, since some of the crisis episodes have taken 
place before the date for which we have data for concentration. Thus, we drop all those crisis 
episodes that precede the initial concentration date.  This leaves us with only 20 crisis episodes and 
less than half of the total number of observations, yet the concentration variable still remains negative 
and significant (column 8, Table 8).   These results lead us to believe that the negative impact of 
concentration on banking system fragility is not due to reverse causality.       
 So far in the analysis, we have allowed for heteroskedasticity of errors and corrected for it, 
but assumed that the errors are independent.  However, given that we use a panel data set, it is likely   21    
that the error terms within individual country observations are correlated with each other.  Table 9, 
column 1 reports our results relaxing the assumption that within country observations are 
independent.  Concentration still enters with a negative and significant coefficient.  In column 2, we 
estimate a logit model with random country effects.  Again, the results are not significantly different. 
We also investigate the sensitivity our results to using alternative samples. In column 3 of 
Table 9, we exclude from the sample all countries with populations less than 1 million.  Results are 
not sensitive to excluding small countries.  In column 4, we exclude all African countries since they 
tend to have very high bank concentration ratios. We see that our results are not driven by African 
observations.  In column 5, we exclude all developed countries from the analysis.  Again, we see that 
concentration significantly reduces fragility also in the sample of developing countries.  Finally, in 
column 6 we exclude a few outlier observations in terms of inflation and interest rates, which leaves 
the results unchanged.
16    
V. Conclusions 
 
This paper investigates the impact of bank concentration, bank regulations, bank ownership, 
and the overall competitive/institutional environment on banking system fragility.  We use cross-
country data on 70 countries and 47 crisis episodes.  In concluding, we emphasize three findings. 
First, bank concentration has a stabilizing effect.  Concentrated banking systems are less 
likely to experience systemic banking crises, even after controlling for a wide array of 
macroeconomic, regulatory and institutional factors.  There is also some evidence that the stabilizing 
effect of bank concentration is weaker at higher levels of concentration, although this does not 
change the fact that the overall impact of concentration on fragility is negative and that the 
                                                                                                                                                                      
15 Also note that the actual crisis period immediately following the crisis is taken out of the estimations. 
16Excluded observations are Gabon (1993) and Ivory Coast (1993) because their M2/reserves values are outliers and Peru 
(1991) because its inflation and real interest rate values are outliers.   22    
relationship holds when controlling for bank regulations and the overall competitive/institutional 
climate.  
Second, confirming the earlier results of Barth et al. (2003), we find that entry barriers and 
activity restrictions have a destabilizing effect on banking systems.  Banking systems where a larger 
fraction of entry applications are denied, and those where regulations restrict banks from engaging in 
non-loan making activities have a greater likelihood of experiencing a systemic crisis.  The data do 
not support the view that more competition induces greater fragility.  Quite to the contrary, more 
competitive banking systems and those with fewer entry regulations and activity restrictions tend to 
be more stable. 
Finally, we find that countries with better-developed institutions and with policies that 
promote competition throughout the economy are less likely to suffer from systemic banking crises.  
The composite indicator of institutional development always has a negative and significant sign in the 
fragility regressions.  Moreover, we find that it is difficult to identify the independent effect of bank 
regulations and bank policies that promote competition from the overall institutional environment.  
Countries with better institutions (property rights, rule of law, political openness, low corruption, 
etc.) also tend to be countries with bank regulations and bank policies that support openness and 
competition.  Thus, while bank regulations and policies that foster competition and contestability 
promote bank stability, these regulations and policies cannot be viewed in isolation from the overall 
institutional environment. 
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 Table 1.  Bank Concentration and Competition and Banking Crises 
 
GDP per capita is in constant dollars, averaged over the entire sample period.  Crisis period denotes the years in which each 
country experienced a systemic banking crisis and the duration of said crisis.  Concentration is a measure of concentration in the 
banking industry, calculated as the fraction of assets held by the three largest banks in each country, averaged over the sample 
period.   Sources are in the data appendix. 
 
    GDP per capita   Crisis Period   Concentration  
Australia   17913    0.65 
Austria   25785    0.75 
Bahrain   9398    0.93 
Belgium   24442    0.64 
Belize   2996     
Benin   362  (1988-90) 1.00 
Botswana   2781    0.94 
Burkina Faso    230  (1988-94)   
Burundi   186    1.00 
Cameroon   790  (1987-93,  1995-98) 0.95 
Canada   18252    0.58 
Chile   3048  (1981-87) 0.49 
Colombia   1802  (1982-85)  0.49 
Congo   940    1.00 
Ivory Coast    843  (1988-91)  0.96 
Cyprus   9267    0.88 
Denmark   31049    0.78 
Dominican Republic    1426    0.65 
Ecuador   1516  (1995-97)  0.40 
Egypt   905    0.67 
El Salvador    1450  (1989)  0.84 
Finland   23304 (1991-94)  0.85 
France   24227    0.44 
Gabon   4625     
Gambia   369     
Germany   27883    0.48 
Ghana   356 (1982-89)  0.89 
Greece   10202    0.79 
Guatemala   1415    0.37 
Guinea   523  (1993-94)   
Guyana   653  (1993-95)  1.00 
Honduras   694    0.44 
India   313  (1991-97)  0.47 
Indonesia   761  (1992-97)  0.44   28    
 
 
    GDP per capita   Crisis Period   Concentration  
Ireland   13419   0.74 
Israel   13355  (1983-84)  0.84 
Italy   17041  (1990-95)  0.35 
Jamaica   1539  (1996-97)  0.82 
Japan   35608  (1992-97)  0.24 
Jordan   1646  (1989-90)  0.92 
Kenya   336  (1993)  0.74 
Korea   6857  (1997)  0.31 
Lesotho   356    1.00 
Malawi   154     
Malaysia   3197  (1985-88,  1997)  0.54 
Mali   260  (1987-89)  0.91 
Mauritania   456  (1984-93)   
Mauritius   2724    0.94 
Mexico   3240  (1982,  1994-97)  0.63 
Nepal   179  (1988-97)  0.90 
Netherlands   22976    0.76 
New Zealand    15539    0.77 
Niger   245  (1983-97)   
Nigeria   251  (1991-95)  0.83 
Norway   28843  (1987-93)  0.85 
Panama   2824  (1988-89)  0.42 
Papua New Guinea    1024  (1989-97)  0.87 
Peru   2458  (1983-90)  0.69 
Philippines   1070 (1981-87)  0.49 
Portugal   8904  (1986-89)  0.46 
Senegal   562  (1988-91)  0.94 
Seychelles   5719     
Sierra Leone    260  (1990-97)  1.00 
Singapore   20079    0.71 
South Africa    3680  (1985)  0.77 
Sri Lanka    588  (1989-93)  0.86 
Swaziland   1254  (1995)  0.95 
Sweden   24845  (1990-93)  0.89 
Switzerland   42658    0.77 
Tanzania   170  (1988-97)  1.00 
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    GDP per capita   Crisis Period   Concentration  
Thailand   1886  (1983-87,  1997)  0.54 
Togo   366    1.00 
Tunisia   1831    0.63 
Turkey    2451  (1982, 1991, 1994)  0.45 
United Kingdom    16883    0.57 
United States    24459  (1980-92)  0.19 
Uruguay   5037  (1981-85)  0.87 
Venezuela   3558  (1993-97)  0.52 
Zambia   464    0.84 
  
 
Table 2.  Summary Statistics and Correlations 
 
Summary statistics are presented in Panel A and correlations in Panel B and C.  Banking crisis is a crisis dummy, which takes on the value of one if there is a systemic and the 
value of zero otherwise.  Growth is the rate of growth of real GDP.  Real interest rate is the nominal interest rate minus the contemporaneous rate of inflation.  Inflation is the rate 
of change of the GDP deflator.  M2/reserves is the ratio of M2 to international reserves.   Credit growth is the real growth of domestic credit, lagged two periods.  Depreciation is 
the rate of change of the exchange rate.  Moral hazard is an aggregate index of moral hazard associated with varying deposit insurance schemes.  Concentration is a measure of 
concentration in the banking industry, calculated as the fraction of assets held by the three largest banks in each country, averaged over the sample period.  Fraction of entry 
applications denied is the number of entry applications denied as a fraction of the number of applications received from domestic and foreign entities.  Activity restrictions 
measures the degree to which a bank is able to engage in business of securities underwriting, insurance underwriting and selling, and in real estate investment, management, and 
development.  Required reserves is the percentage of reserves regulators require to hold.  Capital regulatory index measures capital stringency in the banking system.  State 
ownership measures the percentage of banking system’s assets in banks that are 50% or more government owned, while foreign ownership measures percentage of banking 
system’s assets in banks that are 50% or more foreign owned.  Banking freedom is an indicator of the relative openness of the banking system.  Economic freedom is a composite 
measure of institutional factors determining economic freedom.  KKZ_composite is a composite measure of governance indicators.  Sources are given in the data appendix. 
 
Panel A: Summary Statistics: 
 Mean Median St.Dev.  Maximum Minimum Observations 
Banking crisis  0.04 0.00 0.20  1.00 0.00 1230 
Growth 3.41 3.45 4.25  23.60 -17.15 1216 
Terms of trade change  0.15 0.01 10.30 63.24 -51.45 1191 
Real interest rate  1.58 2.68 19.34 151.21 -283.00 1160 
Inflation 14.07 7.75 23.42  350.56 -29.17 1220 
M2/reserves 19.87 6.56 68.86  1289.31 0.19 1222 
Depreciation 0.10 0.04 0.22  2.62 -0.35 1238 
Credit Growtht-2 6.01 5.09 15.84  115.42 -54.62 1203 
Real GDP per capita  7813.94 2302.37 10299.92  45950.46 134.54 1222 
Moral hazard  -1.09 -2.49 2.24  3.98 -2.49 1238 
Concentration 0.72 0.77 0.21  1.00 0.19 1106 
Fraction of entry applications denied 0.21 0.08 0.29  1.00 0.00 688 
Activity restrictions  9.44 9.00 2.64 14.00 4.00 903 
Required reserves  12.48 10.00 11.86 43.00 0.00 692 
Capital regulatory index  5.41 5.50 1.70 8.00 2.00 871 
State ownership  17.84 11.56 20.95 80.00 0.00 796 
Foreign ownership  23.85 11.70 26.59 99.00 0.00 710 
Banking freedom  3.36 3.00 0.88  5.00 1.00 1184 
Economic freedom  3.17 3.05 0.61  4.50 1.9 1184 
KKZ_composite 0.28 -0.03 0.79  1.72 -1.03 1220   31
  
 
Panel B: Correlations: Banking Crisis, Concentration, Regulations, and Institutions 
 




















Concentration  -0.032                
Fraction of entry 
apps denied 
0.058  0.001              
Activity 
restrictions 
0.058*  -0.027  0.461***            
Required reserves  0.016  0.183***  0.334***  0.233***           
Capital regulatory 
index 
-0.016  0.053  -0.048  -0.084***  0.229***          
Moral  hazard 0.013  -0.396***  -0.238***  -0.248***  -0.105***  0.107***         
State ownership  0.034  0.048  0.433***  0.284*** 0.356***  0.039  -0.022         
Foreign ownership  -0.050  0.394***  0.059  0.025 0.262***  0.192***  -0.321***  -0.234***      
Banking freedom  -0.072***  -0.0249***  -0.382***  -0.477*** -0.101*** 0.077*** 0.174*** -0.385*** 0.190***     
Economic freedom  -0.056**  -0.390***  -0.450***  -0.515*** -0.401***  0.069**  0.327*** -0.539*** -0.003  0.745***   
KKZ_composite -0.070***  0.354*** -0.507***  -0.566***  -0.445*** 0.067** 0.354***  -0.460*** 0.029  0.560***  0.861*** 
***,**, and * indicate statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively. 
 
Panel C: Correlations: Banking Crisis, Concentration, and Macro Indicators 
  Banking  crisis  Real GDP 
growth 




Inflation M2/reserves  Depreciation  Credit  Growtht-2  Real GDP per 
capita 
Real GDP growth 





          

















































Concentration  -0.032 -0.076*** -0.007 0.004  0.000  0.100***  0.044*  -0.001  -0.246*** 
***,**, and * indicate statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively.  
 
Table 3.  Banking Crisis and Concentration 
 
The logit probability model estimated is Banking Crisis [Country=j, Time= t]= α + β1 Real GDP growthj,t+ β2 Terms of trade changej,t + β3 Real interest ratej,t + β4 Inflation j,t + 
β5M2/reservesj,t + β6Depreciationj,t  + β7 Credit growthj,t-2 + β8 Real GDP per capitaj,t+β9 Moral Hazard Indexj,t+β10 Average concentrationj,t+ β11 concentration 
2
j,t+ εj,t. The 
dependent variable is a crisis dummy that takes on the value of one if there is a systemic and the value of zero otherwise.  Growth is the rate of growth of real GDP.  Real interest 
rate is the nominal interest rate minus the contemporaneous rate of inflation.  Inflation is the rate of change of the GDP deflator.  M2/reserves is the ratio of M2 to international 
reserves.   Credit growth is the real growth of domestic credit, lagged two periods.  Depreciation is the rate of change of the exchange rate.  Moral hazard is an aggregate index of 
moral hazard associated with varying deposit insurance schemes. Concentration is a measure of concentration in the banking industry, calculated as the fraction of assets held by 
the three largest banks in each country, averaged over the sample period. Bank data are from the BankScope database of Fitch IBCA. The sample period is 1980-1997. White’s 
heteroskedasiticy consistent standard errors are given in parentheses. Detailed variable definitions and sources are given in the data appendix. 
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2     4.013 
(3.651) 
 
       
No. of Crises  51  47  47  47 
No. of Observations  1103  989  989  989 
%  crises correct  61  66  68  66 
%  correct  73  73  73  71 
Model χ
2  47.94*** 48.46*** 54.38***  37.93*** 
***,**, and * indicate statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively.   33
Table 4.  Banking Crisis, Regulation and Concentration 
 
The logit probability model estimated is Banking Crisis [Country=j, Time= t]= α + β1 Real GDP growthj,t+ β2 Terms of trade changej,t + β3 Real interest ratej,t + β4 Inflation j,t + 
β5M2/reservesj,t + β6Depreciationj,t  + β7 Credit growthj,t-2 + β8Moral Hazard Indexj,t+β9 Concentrationj,t+  β10  Regulatory measuresj,t+  εj,t. The dependent variable is a crisis 
dummy that takes on the value of one if there is a systemic and the value of zero otherwise.   Growth is the rate of growth of real GDP.  Real interest rate is the nominal interest 
rate minus the contemporaneous rate of inflation.  Inflation is the rate of change of the GDP deflator.  M2/reserves is the ratio of M2 to international reserves.   Credit growth is the 
real growth of domestic credit, lagged two periods.  Depreciation is the rate of change of the exchange rate.  Moral hazard is an aggregate index of moral hazard associated with 
varying deposit insurance schemes. Concentration is a measure of concentration in the banking industry, calculated as the fraction of assets held by the three largest banks in each 
country, averaged over the sample period. Bank data are from the BankScope database of Fitch IBCA. The sample period is 1980-1997.  The Regulatory measures in specifications 
(1)-(4) - Fraction of entry applications denied, Activity restrictions, Required reserves and Capital regulatory index, - are included (one at a time) as regressors. Fraction of entry 
applications denied measures the number of entry applications denied as a fraction of the total received.  Activity restrictions captures bank’s ability to engage in business of 
securities underwriting, insurance underwriting and selling, and in real estate investment, management, and development.  Required reserves is the percentage of reserves 
regulators require to hold  Capital regulatory index is a summary measure of capital stringency.  White’s heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors are given in parentheses. 
Detailed variable definitions and sources are given in the data appendix. 
 













   
Activity Restrictions    0.182*** 
(0.073) 
  
Required Reserves      0.017  
(0.017) 
 
Capital Regulatory Index        -0.078  
(0.129) 
      
No.  of  Crises  21 34 27 33 
No.  of  Observations  583 767 572 755 
%  crises correct  67  74  67  70 
%    correct  77 75 72 73 
Model χ
2  31.97*** 37.38*** 30.38*** 37.38*** 
***,**, and * indicate statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively.    34
Table 5.  Banking Crisis, Ownership, Institutions, and Concentration  
 
The logit probability model estimated is Banking Crisis [Country=j, Time= t]= α + β1 Real GDP growthj,t+ β2 Terms of trade changej,t + β3 Real interest ratej,t + β4 Inflation j,t + 
β5M2/reservesj,t + β6Depreciationj,t  + β7 Credit growthj,t-2 +β8 Moral hazard indexj,t + β9 Concentrationj,t + β10  Regulatory measuresj,t+  εj,t. The dependent variable is a crisis 
dummy that takes on the value of one if there is a systemic and the value of zero otherwise.   Growth is the rate of growth of real GDP.  Real interest rate is the nominal interest 
rate minus the contemporaneous rate of inflation.  Inflation is the rate of change of the GDP deflator.  M2/reserves is the ratio of M2 to international reserves.   Credit growth is the 
real growth of domestic credit, lagged two periods.  Depreciation is the rate of change of the exchange rate.  Moral hazard is an aggregate index of moral hazard associated with 
varying deposit insurance schemes. Concentration is a measure of concentration in the banking industry, calculated as the fraction of assets held by the three largest banks in each 
country, averaged over the sample period.  Bank data are from the BankScope database of Fitch IBCA. The sample period is 1980-1997.  The Regulatory measures in n 
specifications (1)-(5) - State ownership, Foreign ownership, Banking freedom, Economic freedom, and KKZ_composite - are included (one at a time) as regressors.   State 
ownership is the percentage of banking system’s assets in banks that are 50% or more government owned. Foreign ownership is the percentage of banking system’s assets in banks 
that are 50% or more foreign owned. Banking freedom is an indicator of relative openness of  banking and financial system, while economic freedom is a composite of 10 
institutional factors determining economic freedom. KKZ_composite is an aggregate measure of six governance indicators. White’s heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors 
are given in parentheses. Detailed variable definitions and sources are given in the data appendix. 
 











State ownership  0.015** 
(0.008) 
    
Foreign ownership    -0.003  
(0.008) 
   
Banking Freedom       -0.513*** 
(0.164) 
  
Economic  Freedom      -0.554*** 
(0.227) 
 
KKZ_composite       -0.484*** 
(0.203) 
       
No.  of  Crises  32 31 47 47 47 
No.  of  obs.  686 609 955 955 989 
%    crises  correct  75 71 68 66 68 
%    correct  69 66 69 70 72 
Model χ
2  30.90*** 33.66*** 52.31*** 47.01*** 48.77*** 
***,**, and * indicate statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively.    35
Table 6.  Banking Crisis, Governance, Ownership, Institutions, and Concentration  
 
The logit probability model estimated is Banking Crisis [Country=j, Time= t]= α + β1 Real GDP growthj,t+ β2 Terms of trade changej,t + β3 Real interest ratej,t + β4 Inflation j,t + 
β5M2/reservesj,t + β6Depreciationj,t  + β7 Credit growthj,t-2 +β8 Moral hazard indexj,t +β9  KKZ_compositej,t + β10 Concentrationj,t+,t β11  Regulatory measuresj,t+  εj,t. The dependent 
variable is a crisis dummy that takes on the value of one if there is a systemic and the value of zero otherwise.   Growth is the rate of growth of real GDP.  Real interest rate is the 
nominal interest rate minus the contemporaneous rate of inflation.  Inflation is the rate of change of the GDP deflator.  M2/reserves is the ratio of M2 to international reserves.   
Credit growth is the real growth of domestic credit, lagged two periods.  Depreciation is the rate of change of the exchange rate.  Moral hazard is an aggregate index of moral 
hazard associated with varying deposit insurance schemes. KKZ_composite is an aggregate measure of six governance indicators. Concentration is a measure of concentration in 
the banking industry, calculated as the fraction of assets held by the three largest banks in each country, averaged over the sample period.  Bank data are from the BankScope 
database of Fitch IBCA. The sample period is 1980-1997.  The Regulatory measures in n specifications (1)-(4) – Fraction of entry applications, denied, Activity restrictions, and 
State ownership - are included (one at a time) as regressors. Fraction of entry applications denied measures the number of entry applications denied as a fraction of the total 
received.  Activity restrictions captures bank’s ability to engage in business of securities underwriting, insurance underwriting and selling, and in real estate investment, 
management, and development.  State ownership is the percentage of banking system’s assets in banks that are 50% or more government owned.  Banking freedom is an indicator 
of relative openness of  banking and financial system, while economic freedom is a composite of 10 institutional factors determining economic freedom.  White’s 
heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors are given in parentheses. Detailed variable definitions and sources are given in the data appendix. 
 


















      





Activity Restrictions      0.162* 
(0.992) 
 
State  ownership      0.011 
(0.009) 
      
No.  of  Crises  47 21 34 32 
No.  of  obs.  989 583 767 686 
%  crises correct  68  67  74  75 
%    correct  72 77 74 70 
Model χ
2  48.77*** 43.78*** 46.01*** 40.04*** 




Table 7.  Banking Crisis and High Concentration: Robustness Tests 
 
The logit probability model estimated is Banking Crisis [Country=j, Time= t]= α + β1 Real GDP growthj,t+ β2 Terms of trade changej,t + β3 Real interest ratej,t + β4 Inflation j,t + 
β5M2/reservesj,t + β6Depreciationj,t  + β7 Credit growthj,t-2 + β8 Real GDP per capitaj,t+β9 Moral Hazard Indexj,t+β10 Average concentrationj,t+ β11High concentrationj,t+ εj,t. The 
dependent variable is a crisis dummy that takes on the value of one if there is a systemic and the value of zero otherwise.  Growth is the rate of growth of real GDP.  Real interest 
rate is the nominal interest rate minus the contemporaneous rate of inflation.  Inflation is the rate of change of the GDP deflator.  M2/reserves is the ratio of M2 to international 
reserves.   Credit growth is the real growth of domestic credit, lagged two periods.  Depreciation is the rate of change of the exchange rate.  Moral hazard is an aggregate index of 
moral hazard associated with varying deposit insurance schemes. Concentration is a measure of concentration in the banking industry, calculated as the fraction of assets held by 
the three largest banks in each country, averaged over the sample period.  High concentration is a dummy taking a value of one in cases where the banking concentration is greater 
than or equal to the cutoff listed in the footnote of the table. Bank data are from the BankScope database of Fitch IBCA. The sample period is 1980-1997. Specifications (1)- (6) 






th percentile, respectively.  White’s heteroskedasiticy consistent standard errors are given in parentheses. Detailed 
variable definitions and sources are given in the data appendix. 
 





























2           43.831* 
(25.830) 
Concentration
3           -20.968* 
(13.735) 
            
No. of Crises  47  47  47  47  47  47  47 
No. of Observations  989  989  989  989  989  989  989 
%  crises correct  70  75  75  70  70  66  75 
%  correct  72  72  62  73  73  72  73 
Model χ
2  48.67*** 51.49***  56.18***  56.05*** 56.05*** 52.33***  55.35*** 
Value of cutoff  0.73927  0.76707  0.78977  0.83955  0.84154  0.87530   
***,**, and * indicate statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively. 







Table 8.  Banking Crisis and Concentration: Alternative Crisis and Concentration Measures 
 
The logit probability model estimated is Banking Crisis [Country=j, Time= t]= α + β1 Real GDP growthj,t+ β2 Terms of trade changej,t + β3 Real interest ratej,t + β4 Inflation j,t + 
β5M2/reservesj,t + β6Depreciationj,t  + β7 Credit growthj,t-2 + β8 Real GDP per capitaj,t+β9 Moral Hazard Indexj,t+β10 Average concentrationj,t+ εj,t. The dependent variable is a crisis 
dummy that takes on the value of one if there is a systemic and the value of zero otherwise.  Growth is the rate of growth of real GDP.  Real interest rate is the nominal interest rate 
minus the contemporaneous rate of inflation.  Inflation is the rate of change of the GDP deflator.  M2/reserves is the ratio of M2 to international reserves.   Credit growth is the real 
growth of domestic credit, lagged two periods.  Depreciation is the rate of change of the exchange rate.  Moral hazard is an aggregate index of moral hazard associated with 
varying deposit insurance schemes. Concentration is a measure of concentration in the banking industry, calculated as the fraction of assets held by the three largest banks in each 
country, averaged over the sample period.  Bank data are from the BankScope database of Fitch IBCA. The sample period is 1980-1997. Specification (2) includes the crisis period 
as crisis observations.  Specification (3) includes the crisis period (after the initial crisis year) as non-crisis observations. Specifications (4) and (5) use alternative definitions of 
crisis based on Caprio and Klingebiel (1999).  In specification (6) Average Concentration is replaced by the concentration data from Barth, Caprio and Levine (2001) – Bank 
Regulation and Supervision, for the entire sample period.  In specification (7) Average Concentration is replaced by Initial Concentration, for the entire sample period. In 
specification (8) Initial Concentration is restricted to the actual starting date and the years following that date (for many of the countries, the restricted sample is either 1988-97 or 
1990-97) White’s heteroskedasiticy consistent standard errors are given in parentheses. Detailed variable definitions and sources are given in the data appendix. 
 

















          
No.  of  Crises  47  202  47 40 50 32 47 20 
No. of Observations  989  1144  1144  938  980  730  989  410 
%    crises  correct  66 59 68 70 72 72 66 70 
%    correct  73 67 67 69 61 75 74 77 
Model χ
2  48.46*** 90.50*** 37.54*** 49.56*** 56.50*** 47.99*** 47.29*** 40.62*** 
***,**, and * indicate statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively. 




Table 9.  Banking Crisis and Concentration: Additional Robustness Tests 
 
The logit probability model estimated is Banking Crisis [Country=j, Time= t]= α + β1 Real GDP growthj,t+ β2 Terms of trade changej,t + β3 Real interest ratej,t + β4 Inflation j,t + 
β5M2/reservesj,t + β6Depreciationj,t  + β7 Credit growthj,t-2 + β8 Real GDP per capitaj,t+β9 Moral Hazard Indexj,t+β10 Average concentrationj,t+ εj,t. The dependent variable is a crisis 
dummy that takes on the value of one if there is a systemic and the value of zero otherwise.  Growth is the rate of growth of real GDP.  Real interest rate is the nominal interest rate 
minus the contemporaneous rate of inflation.  Inflation is the rate of change of the GDP deflator.  M2/reserves is the ratio of M2 to international reserves.   Credit growth is the real 
growth of domestic credit, lagged two periods.  Depreciation is the rate of change of the exchange rate.  Moral hazard is an aggregate index of moral hazard associated with 
varying deposit insurance schemes. Concentration is a measure of concentration in the banking industry, calculated as the fraction of assets held by the three largest banks in each 
country, averaged over the sample period.  Bank data are from the BankScope database of Fitch IBCA. The sample period is 1980-1997. In specification (1) the sample is clustered 
by country.  In specification (2) the estimation includes  random country effects.  In specification (3) the sample excludes all countries with populations less than 1 million. In 
specification (4)  the sample excludes all African countries.  In specification (5) the sample excludes all developed countries.  In specification (6) we remove outliers found in three 
control variables – real interest rate, inflation, and m2/reserves. White’s heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors are given in parentheses. Detailed  variable definitions and 
sources are given in the data appendix. 
 













        
No.  of  Crises  47 47 45 35 39 47 
No.  of  Observations  997 989 927 734 670 987 
%  crises correct  66    67  69  77  68 
%  correct  73    73  68  52  73 
Model χ
2  54.50*** 40.96*** 56.74*** 45.18***  29.01**  48.89*** 
***,**, and * indicate statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively.   39
Data Appendix 
 
Variable Name  Definition  Source 
Banking crisis  Dummy takes on value of one during episodes identified as a 
systematic banking crises 
Demirguc-Kunt and Detragaiche (2001)  
Growth  Rate of growth of real GDP  WDI (World Bank) 
Terms of trade change  Change in the terms of trade  WDI (World Bank) 
Real interest rate  Nominal interest rate minus the contemporaneous rate of 
inflation 
IFS (IMF)  
Inflation  Rate of change of GDP deflator  IFS (IMF) 
M2/reserves  Ratio of M2 to international reserves  IFS (IMF) 
Depreciation  Rate of depreciation  IFS (IMF) 
Credit growth  Rate of growth of real domestic credit to the private sector  IFS line 32d divided by GDP deflator  
GDP/CAP  Real GDP per capita  WDI (World Bank) 
GDP   Real GDP in billions of US dollars  WDI (World Bank) 
Moral hazard index  Principal component indicator measuring the generosity of 
deposit insurance, based on co-insurance, coverage of foreign 
currency and interbank deposits, type and source of funding, 
management, membership and level of explicit coverage. 
DD (2003)   
Concentration  Degree of concentration in the banking industry, calculated as 
the fraction of assets held by the three largest banks. Averaged 
over the 1988-97 period. 
Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, Levine (2000) - Financial Structures Database 
Mean Bank Size  Total banking assets divided by number of banks.   BankScope database. 
No Foreign Loans  Survey question 7.2 asks if banks are prohibited from making 
loans abroad (yes=1, no=0).   
Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2001) - Survey of Bank Regulation and Supervision 
No. of Banks  No. of banks in hundreds.  Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2001) - Survey of Bank Regulation and Supervision 
Fraction of entry applications denied  Number of entry applications denied as a fraction of the number 
of applications received from domestic and foreign entities 
 
Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2001) - Survey of Bank Regulation and Supervision 
Activity restrictions  Sum of four measures that indicate whether bank activities in 
the securities, insurance, and real estate markets and ownership 
and control of nonfinancial firms are (1) unrestricted, (2) 
permitted, (3) restricted, or (4) prohibited 
Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2001) - Survey of Bank Regulation and Supervision 
Required reserves  Ratio of reserves required to be held by banks  Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2001) - Survey of Bank Regulation and Supervision 
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Variable Name  Definition  Source 
Capital regulatory index  Summary measure of capital stringency: sum of overall and 
initial capital stringency.  Higher values indicate greater 
stringency. 
 
Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2001) - Survey of Bank Regulation and Supervision 
State ownership  Percentage of banking system’s assets in banks that are 50% or 
more government owned 
 
Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2001) - Survey of Bank Regulation and Supervision 
Foreign ownership  Percentage of banking system’s assets in banks that are 50% or 
more foreign owned 
 
Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2001) - Survey of Bank Regulation and Supervision 
Banking Freedom  Indicator of relative openness of  banking and financial system: 
specifically, whether the foreign banks and financial services 
firms are able to operate freely, how difficult it is to open 
domestic banks and other financial services firms, how heavily 
regulated the financial system is, the presence of state-owned 
banks, whether the government influences allocation of credit, 
and whether banks are free to provide customers with insurance 
and invest in securities (and vice-versa).  The index ranges in 
value from 1 (very low – banks are primitive) to 5 (very high – 
few restrictions).  Averaged over 1995-97 period. 
 
Index of Economic Freedom (Heritage Foundation) 
Economic Freedom 
 
Composite of 10 institutional factors determining economic 
freedom: trade policy, fiscal burden of government, government 
intervention in the economy, monetary policy, capital flows and 
foreign investment, banking and finance, wages and prices, 
property rights, regulation, and black market activity. Individual 
factors are weighted equally to determine overall score of 
economic freedom.  A high score signifies an institutional or 
consistent set of policies that are most conducive to economic 
freedom, while a score close to 1 signifies a set of policies that 
are least conducive.  Averaged over 1995-97 period.  
 
Index of Economic Freedom (Heritage Foundation) 
KKZ_composite Composite  of  six governance indicators (1998 data): voice and 
accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, 
regulatory quality, rule of law, and corruption.  Individual factors 
are weighted equally to determine overall score of economic 
freedom.  Higher values correspond to better governance 
outcomes. 
 
Kaufman, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton(1999) 
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